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This paper examines voluntary market-making behavior, namely scalping, in futures 
markets. Specifically, this paper studies what factors determine scalpers’ entry and exit, and 
how scalping affects market liquidity and price volatility. The data used for the analysis are 
time-stamped electronic transaction data marked with traders’ identities from the Dalian 
Futures Exchanges in China. The contributions of this paper are: (1) to give detailed 
analysis of scalping behavior and its impact on market liquidity; (2) to develop new 
econometric tools for analyzing time-series count data; (3) to propose a new measure of 
liquidity.  
 
Keywords: Liquidity, Market-Making, Futures Markets, Scalpers, Autoregressive 
Conditional Intensity (ACI), Volatility.   2 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper is a study of voluntary market-making behavior, scalping, in futures markets. 
Specifically, this paper examines why scalping arises in futures markets, what factors 
determine scalpers’ entry and exit, and how scalping affects market liquidity and price 
volatility. In futures exchanges, a scalper is usually identified as someone who makes 
frequent purchases and sales during the day, yet ending the day without any outstanding 
position. Collectively, scalpers voluntarily approximate the role of market-makers, providing 
the liquidity so essential to futures markets. We believe that the study of scalpers is of 
significant importance because the existence of scalpers in futures markets provides an ideal 
opportunity for us to study spontaneously emerged market-making behavior and its effects on 
market performance in a competitive continuous auction environment, free of any exchange 
regulations on market-making. In particular, we focus on the liquidity aspect of market 
performance. 
 
The earliest work on scalpers is by Working (1954, 1967, 1977), who studied two months 
of trading records for “Mr. C”, a leading floor trader on the New York Cotton Exchange in 
1952. Working presented descriptive statistics and discussions on scalping behavior in his 
papers, and in particular suggested that scalping contributes to market “fluidity”, and that 
scalpers “derive income from hedgers through temporarily absorbing hedging orders that are 
not immediately absorbed otherwise”. Working (1967) also touched on the issue that 
scalping profit is positively related to trading frequency and negatively related to trade size. 
Silber (1984) analyzed six weeks of trading records from “Mr. X”, a “representative scalper” 
on the New York Futures Exchange during 1982-1983, and derived similar conclusions 
regarding scalping strategy and profit. By studying the Computerized Trade Reconstruction 
(CTR) records of twelve active futures from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) from 
July through September 1990, Kuserk and Locke (1993) identified scalpers for each contract, 
and find that scalping revenue varies across commodities, and that scalpers tend to specialize 
in a particular commodity. 
 
Both Working (1967, 1977) and Silber (1984) base their discussion on only one or two 
scalpers, and the CTR data analyzed by Kuserk and Locke (1993) are complied from paper 
records at the end of a trading day and time stamped accurate only to a 15-minute bracket. 
Thanks to the implementation of electronic trading systems, we have obtained all the 
transaction records of soybean futures from the Dalian Futures Exchange in China for the 
period June through December 1999 and April 2000. The data are time stamped to the second 
and each transaction record is marked with the trader’s identity. This code for the trades 
reveals not just the broker but also the individual customer. While previous studies of 
scalpers are mostly descriptive, this paper presents formal econometric tests of three 
hypotheses: 1) scalpers are attracted to the market by liquidity; 2) scalpers’ trading 
contributes to the liquidity of the market; 3) scalpers’ trading has a negative effect on price 
volatility.  
 
Liquidity is an important concept of market performance. The greater the liquidity, the 
smaller the price effects of trades, and thus the smaller the trading cost and the greater the 
ability of traders to hedge their price risks. There are two conventional measurements of   3 
liquidity: one method is to use bid-ask spreads as a proxy, the smaller the bid-ask spread, the 
more liquid the market; the other approach, proposed by Kyle (1984), is to regress price 
changes on order flows. The coefficient on order flow measures the price impact of trades, 
consequently, the smaller this coefficient, the greater the liquidity. This paper reexamines the 
concept of liquidity and suggests a new statistical measurement for it. 
 
At the short interval over which scalping matters, the number of scalpers and the number 
of scalper’s trades are both small integers. A new class of models, termed autoregressive 
conditional intensity (ACI) processes, allows one to generate dynamic forecasts of a time-
series count model. We focus on how liquidity and scalping profit affect the number of 
scalpers that participate in trading in a fixed time interval. Using an ACI model, we specify a 
distribution for the count variable, which is the number of scalpers in this case, and the mean 
of the count variable conditioning on exogenous and predetermined variables, such as the 
past information on liquidity, profit, and the number of scalpers participating in trading. In 
futures markets, there are in general several contracts of the same commodity with different 
maturity dates, and it is common to find two or more contracts that are actively traded at the 
same time. To take into account this simultaneity effect, a bivariate ACI model is introduced 
to study how liquidity and profit affect scalpers’ participation across two of the most active 
contracts in the Dalian Futures Exchange during our sample period. The model is estimated 
by maximizing the likelihood of the joint probability distribution of a bivariate count 
variable. The results suggest that greater liquidity and larger realized spread encourage 
scalping in contracts, but discourage scalping across contracts. We also find that both 
scalpers and non-scalpers contribute to liquidity in the market, but non-scalpers are the 
source of price volatility. 
 
The organization of this papers is as follow. Section II presents the issues and hypotheses, 
and discusses the concept of liquidity and proposes a new measurement for it; Section III 
develops the ACI model and discusses its broader application as a time-series count model. A 
GARCH model is also specified in this section to study the heterogeneous price effects of 
trading by scalpers and non-scalpers. Estimation results are reported as well. Section IV 
concludes the paper. 
 
II.  Issues and Hypotheses 
The existence of scalpers in futures markets provides an ideal opportunity for studying 
the effects of self-styled market-making behavior in a competitive continuous auction 
market. There are several issues we would like to address in this paper. First, why does 
voluntary market-making behavior, scalping, arise in futures market? What factors determine 
scalpers’ entry and exit? Second, who provides liquidity to the market? Third, does scalping 
affect the price volatility of the market, and if so, how? The hypotheses corresponding to 
these questions are, 
 
Hypothesis 1. Liquidity of a market attracts scalpers, and the number of scalpers is also 
positively related to scalpers’ realized spread; 
Hypothesis 2. Scalpers’ trading increases the liquidity of the market; 
Hypothesis 3. Scalpers’ trading has a stabilizing effect on price, i.e., scalpers’ 
participation negatively affects price volatility.   4 
 
The remainder of this session discusses the concept of liquidity and introduces a new 




Why does scalping arise in futures markets? In any competitive market, be it a financial 
market, the housing market, or the used cars market, there are urgent buyers and sellers. 
According to Working (1954, p.4), “in markets where there are frequent purchases and sales 
for whatever the market will bring, some people make a more or less regular business of 
buying from urgent sellers in order to sell to urgent buyers.” As long as there are enough 
market orders demanding immediate execution, there will be demand and payoff for a 
matching business in this market. Market-makers on NASDAQ, specialists on NYSE, and 
scalpers in futures markets can all be considered as providers of this matching service. By 
buying and selling frequently, scalpers serve the need of urgent buyers and sellers, no matter 
whether purposefully or unconsciously. If a trader needs to buy immediately, he is likely to 
pay a higher price to transact now than waiting until later; while a urgent seller would have to 
accept a lower offer if he is impatient. Such price differences paid by urgent buyers and 
sellers are costs of immediate execution, or the “price of immediacy” (Demsetz, 1968; 
Grossman and Miller, 1988); from the perspective of scalpers, they derive their profit by 
providing this liquidity service to impatient traders.   
 
Whether formal exchanges or informal dealer networks, markets provide liquidity 
through the provision of the lowest cost trading. From the perspective of a market’s users, the 
costs of trading fall into two broad categories, explicit costs, such as commissions and 
clearing fees, and implicit costs, such as “execution costs”. There are two ways to understand 
the “execution cost”. One way is to consider it as the “cost of immediate transaction”, which 
is the price difference paid by urgent buyers and sellers. If a market-maker or a scalper 
crosses an urgent “buyer’s price” and an urgent “seller’s price” at the same time, then the 
price difference is the market-maker or the scalper’s realized spread. Lower spreads 
correspond to lower trading costs, hence a more liquid market. Bid-ask spreads have been 
widely used as a conventional proxy for liquidity. Strictly speaking, the spread is considered 
as an appropriate measure of liquidity only if the market maker crosses a trade at a bid and an 
ask simultaneously (Grossman and Miller, 1988). The drawback of the spread as a measure 
of liquidity is that if price varies with trade size, the spread for large trades may be larger 
than the small trade spread, which creates difficulty for comparing the liquidity of different 
markets (O’Hara, 1995).  
 
Another way to understand “implicit costs” is to consider the “price impact” of trades. If 
it happens that the price drops sharply immediately after a trader places a market order to 
sell, or the price rise suddenly after he places a market order to buy, his implicit trading costs 
are high, perhaps higher than his explicit trading costs, indeed perhaps so high that he ceases 
trading on that exchange. These trading costs reflect the market’s illiquidity. To measure the 
“price impact” of trades, Kyle (1984) proposed a linear model regressing price changes on 
order flow, where the parameter on order flow is defined as λ .  The λ  measures price impact 
of trade, so the smaller the λ , the more liquid the market. Kyle also suggests that λ  is closely 
related to bid-ask spread.    5 
 
Despite the simplicity of Kyle’s model, liquidity is interpreted only in the context of a 
linear model. A single statistic for liquidity would provide more flexibility for econometric 
modeling and testing. Recognizing this need, we introduce here a new measurement of 
liquidity. A market is said to be liquid if traders are able to make large transactions with 
minimal impact on price. One can see from this description that there are two dimensions to 
liquidity, one is volume, the other is price effect. Price effect can be measured by changes in 





liquidity =          ( 1 )  
 
where σ  is the standard deviation of price. This measurement of liquidity represents how 
much volume it takes to move price by one unit, in this case, one standard deviation. The 
inverse of this statistic measures the price impact of trading volume, the smaller the price 
impact, the greater the liquidity. In this paper, we focus on this measurement of liquidity, and 
study the relationship between scalping and liquidity in the futures market. 
 
In summary, a liquid market provides low-cost trading, which attracts market orders, and 
as long as there are enough market orders demanding immediate execution, there will be a 
demand and payoff for scalpers’ services. Scalpers’ participation in turn works like a 
catalysis to trades, which increases the ability of the market to absorb large order imbalance 
in order flow with a minimal impact on price. In this sense, scalpers’ trading decreases the 
trading costs for other traders, and increases the liquidity of the market. The entry and exit of 
scalping (market-making) business depends on the profit made by scalpers (market-makers), 
which is positively related to scalping volume and scalpers’ (market-makers’) realized 
spread. Notice that a drop in realized spread does not necessarily discourage scalping 
(market-making) - one may argue that smaller spread is a sign of more liquidity, and a more 
liquid market attracts higher volume of market orders, which in turn attracts scalping 
(market-making) business. For example, studies on the impact of recent market reforms on 
NASDAQ have found that the average number of dealers that make a market in a stock 
increases from 21 to about 25 despite the decrease in bid-ask spread after the new regulations 
are implemented (Weston, 2000). This phenomenon can be well explained by the fact that the 
post-reform NASDAQ, a much more liquid market, attracts more volume, thus more market 




Another issue we would like to explore is how scalping affects price volatility. Because 
price changes are caused by the shocks of order imbalance, if scalpers’ trading indeed 
absorbs part of this shock, one can expect to see a less volatile market with the participation 
of scalpers. For instance, at one point of time, if buy orders exceed sell orders in size, prices 
will tend to rise for the short-term. A scalper could step in and offer to sell, and the offer 
from the scalper with the lowest ask will get executed. In this case, scalping tends to release 
some pressure of price increasing. Working (1977) noted that there is “price jiggling” in the   6 
futures market, i.e., small price changes in one direction immediately followed by a price 
change in the opposite direction. Working attributes this price pattern to the imbalance of 
market orders at a point of time. Working (1967) also suggests that scalping tends to restrict 
the size of price jiggling. Garbade and Silber (1979) also touch on the issue that scalpers’ 
participation in a continuous auction reduces the volatility of transaction prices around the 
true (temporarily integrated) equilibrium price. Daigler and Wiley (1999) find that clearing 
members in the futures market who observe the order flow reduce the volatility of their own 
trades. Thus, our third hypothesis is intended to study the heterogeneous price effects of 
trading by scalpers and non-scalpers. 
 




During a visit to the Dalian Futures Exchange in summer 2000, we obtained eight months 
of transaction records of soybean futures for the period of June 1999 through December 
1999, and April 2000. Each transaction record is marked with broker and customer identities, 
transaction price and volume, a buy or sell indicator, an indicator of opening or closing 
positions, as well as a time stamp. There are six soybean futures contracts on the Dalian 
Futures Exchange, namely January, March, May, July, September, and November 
expirations. A contract expires in its delivery month, and the trading of this contract usually 
ends around the middle of the delivery month. For example, trading on July 2000 futures 
contract started mid July 1999, and ended mid July 2000. The trading of a contract gains a lot 
of momentum usually two months after its first trading date, and remains active for about 
another two months before the volume declines dramatically, but the trend of the trading 
activity also depends on the season as well as the trading on the spot market (Figure 1). In the 
Dalian Futures Exchange, soybeans futures are most active during the period of September 
through following January, when trading is heavy and price is volatile. The futures prices 
determined during this period set up the leadership for the rest of the season (Dalian Futures 
Exchange, 2000). 
 
An analysis of the transaction records reveals several key facts. There are approximately 
170 member firms trading in the sample period, and most of these member firms are 
brokerage firms representing approximately 2500-5000 individual customers, as well as a 
few member firms, called “locals”, who trade for their own accounts (Table 1). By the 
regulations of the Dalian Futures Exchange, a brokerage firm is prohibited from trading for 
its own account; and those member firms trading for their own account cannot have 
brokerage business. For instance, in April 2000, there are 145 members firms in total, 130 of 
them are brokerage firms, which have 5,122 distinctive customers in all.
1 The remaining 15 
are member firms trading only for their own accounts, each of whom has one seat.
2 A 
member firm can have several seats on the exchange floor, and it can also apply for a 
distance trading seat, and trade directly off the exchange. Sometimes, one of the member 
                                                        
1 A customer is not allowed to open accounts with more than one brokerage firm. 
2 The annual fee of a seat is RMB20,000, which is regulated by the exchange.   7 
firm’s seats serves only one customer.
3 Among the 130 brokerage firms, one has four seats, 




How to identify scalpers among over five thousand customers? Remember that scalpers 
are those who trade frequently during the day, and who rarely hold any significant overnight 
positions. There is only one two-and-a-half-hour morning session from 9:00am to 11:30am 
during a trading day in the Dalian Futures Exchange before April 2000. We define “frequent” 
as making at least one trade within every 15 minutes on average, which is equivalent to 
placing at least 10 orders a day. For example, there are 20 trading days in June 1999, if in any 
day, a customer places at least 10 orders of any contract, and holds an zero inventory at the 
end of the day, he becomes a candidate for scalper. If he trades with such a pattern for at least 
six or seven days in this month, he is considered as a scalper. These two selection criteria 
filter out about 10 scalper candidates each month from June to December 1999. There are 
some final justifications to these scalper candidates. Some traders are selected by these two 
criteria, but their trading pattern is characterized by placing many one-side orders at one 
point of time, and half-an-hour or an hour or so later, they liquidate their positions by placing 
many opposite-side orders. These traders are considered as day traders, and they are excluded 
from the scalpers’ group. Another justification we make is that a trader has been consistently 
selected as a scalper for most of time in the sample, but in one month, he trades actively and 
holds a zero position at the end of day for only four or five days. In this case, he is still 
considered as a scalper for this month. Starting from April 2000, the Dalian Futures 
Exchange added an afternoon session from 1:30pm to 3:00pm. The total trading time is four 
hours. Using the same criteria of trading frequency and the overnight position discussed 
above, seven traders are classified as scalpers. The number of scalpers over time is reported 
in Table 1. It is worth pointing out that the three most active scalpers are new entries in April 
2000. Due to lack of data for the first three months of the year 2000, one cannot judge when 
these three scalpers enter the market-making business. Three of the remaining four scalpers 
have been in the market since June 1999, and they have been identified as scalpers 
consistently. Scalper’s volume accounts for about 6% to13% of the total trading volume of 




We aggregate the transaction data at five-minute intervals, and there are 30 five-minute 
intervals between 9:00am and 11:30am. Those transactions recorded as having happened 
between 11:30am and 11:31am, are aggregated into the 31st five-minute interval. A scalper 
usually closes his position within several minutes. A five-minute interval is long enough to 
measure some relevant statistics, and short enough for us to observe the microstructure of the 
trading. Within each five-minute interval, volume is measured as the total sum of the volume 
for each pair of transactions; Price volatility is measured as the standard deviation of price 
(σ ); Scalpers’ realized spread is the volume-weighted average profit made by scalpers, which 
is the average sales price minus the average purchase price; Number of scalpers and number 
                                                        
3 In some cases, such a customer trades much like a scalper.   8 
of traders that have participated in trading are also calculated for each five-minute interval. 
Following (1), liquidity is defined as volume/σ , where the unit of volume is 100,000 ton. 
 
In order to illustrate the intraday trading patterns, 31 time-of-the-day dummy variables 
are defined corresponding to each five-minute interval. Using data of May 2000 soybean 
futures contract, linear models with only these dummy variables as dependent variables are 
estimated for liquidity, volatility, and the number of scalpers. The coefficient estimates of the 
dummies are plotted in Figure 2. We can see from these charts that liquidity tends to be high 
right after the opening of the market and right before market closing. There is a break from 
10:15am to10:30am on the exchange, and liquidity picks up a little right before 10:15am and 
right after 10:30am. The intraday seasonality plot of liquidity shows a U-shape pattern, we 
call it liquidity smile. Well-documented volatility smile is also shown in Figure 2. The 




A Univariate ACI Model 
 
It has been discussed in part III that scalpers’ entry and exit are determined by  
scalpers’ profit, which is affected by scalpers’ realized spread and market liquidity. To test 
the first two hypotheses raised in part III, we propose a model that incorporates the dynamics 
of the number of scalpers as a function of liquidity and realized spread. The number of 
scalpers (xt) present in a five-minute interval is a time-series count variable. One natural 
assumption is that the number of scalpers (xt) is Poisson distributed after adjusting for 
intraday seasonality. Some examples that can be assumed to have the Poisson process are, 
arrivals of customers at a service facility, arrivals of phone calls at a switchboard, fatal 
automobile accidents at a busy intersection, emissions of α -particles from radioactive 
substance, and so on. All of these are “rather infrequent events that occur at ‘random times’-
with irregular spacing, occasionally close together, sometimes far apart, and with no apparent 
periodicities. Over any two long periods of time of equal length there are about the same 
number of occurrences, so the rate of occurrence is constant over time” (Berry and Lindgren, 
1996).  
 
Under the Poisson assumption, the distribution of (xt) can be written as 
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where λ t is the conditional intensity of the Poisson process, in our application, the average 
number of scalpers in a unit interval [t, t-1). Zt-1 is a vector of exogenous and predetermined 
variables, 
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   9 
where liqt-1 is liquidity measured as in (1), and spreadt-1 is the volume-weighted average 
realized spread of scalpers between [t-1, t-2). The conditional intensity λ t can be specified as 
   ∑
=
− − + + =
31
1
1 1 ) log(
i
t t it i t Z x d γ β τ λ        ( 3 )  
where dit is a time-of-the-day dummy variable, and dit=1 ∀  t∈  i
th interval. The intraday 
seasonal pattern illustrated in Figure 2 is captured with the set of 31 time-of-the-day 
dummies in (3).  
Jorda and Marcellino (2000) recognize the need for a dynamic model and then introduce 
an Autoregressive Conditional Intensity (ACI) model for the conditional intensity, which is, 
  ∑
=
− − − + + + =
31
1
1 1 1) log( ) log(
i
t t t it i t Z x d γ β λ α τ λ     (4) 
where log(λ t-1) characterizes the autoregressive nature of the model. The term xt-1 captures 
the dynamic effect of surprises in the count variable xt. The role of the term xt-1 is similar in 
nature to the moving average term in a typical ARMA model. It is therefore natural to name 
the model in (4) as an autoregressive conditional intensity model, ACI(1,1), where the first 
term in parentheses refers to the presence of a first-order autoregressive term, and the second 
term in parentheses refers to the presence of a first-order moving average term. The 
application of the ACI model is not limited to the problems we present here. Rather, it is a 
general formulation for dynamic time-series count-data problems.  
A Bivariate ACI Model 
There are six soybean futures contracts with different maturity dates in the Dalian Futures 
Exchange. We find that scalpers tend to participate in the two most actively traded contracts 
during a trading day. It is common practice for a scalper to concentrate on the trading of one 
contract for one or two hours and then switch to the trading of another contract. It is 
reasonable to assume that a scalper’s participation in the trading of the second most active 
contract is dependent on his participation in the trading of the most active contract. A 
bivariate ACI model can be specified to incorporate this simultaneity effect of scalpers’ 
trading. Let yt denote the number of scalpers in the dominant contract, and xt the number of 
scalpers in the second contract. Without loss of generality, the joint distribution of  (xt ,yt) can 
be decomposed as 
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Each probability density is assumed to be a Poisson distribution, 
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Another issue of our interest is to find out who provides liquidity. By differentiating 
scalpers’ and non-scalpers’ volume, we are able to examine the heterogeneous effect of 
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where  t ν  is the average trading volume per scalper, and  t ρ  is the average trading volume per 
non-scalper. 
 
Modeling Price Volatility 
 
The GARCH(1,1) model proposed by Bollerslev (1986) has become a benchmark to 
model financial asset return volatility. It is specified as 
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where pt is the average price within each five-minute interval. The conditional variance σ t
2 is 
the one-period ahead forecast variance based on past information, it has three components: 
1). The mean ω ; 2). News about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of 
the squared residual from the mean equation, 
2
1 − t ε , which is the ARCH term; 3). Last period’s   11
forecast variance, 
2
1 − t σ , which is the GRACH term. This specification is interpreted as a 
trader predicting this period’s variance by forming a weighted average of a long term average 
(the constant), the forecasted variance from last period, and information about volatility 
observed in the previous period.  
 
To study the heterogeneous effect of trading by scalpers and non-scalpers on price 
volatility, the conditional variance equation (10) may be modified to allow for the inclusion 
of exogenous regressors, Φ , 
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where Φ t=(svolt, nsvolt, pt
2), svolt is the trading volume by scalpers, and nsvolt is the trading 
volume by non-scalpers.  
 
Estimation and Results 
 
Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the ACI in (4). The ACI model is estimated 
using transaction data for May and July 2000 soybean futures contracts for the period June 
1999 through December 1999. The advantage of the ACI specification over the Poisson 
specification of the conditional intensity is highlighted by the reduction of the absolute value 
of the log-likelihood, which is 48% for May 2000 contract and 43% for July 2000 contract 
(Table 5).  
 
The estimates of the ACI model are reported in Table 6. For both May and July 2000 
contracts, the coefficient estimates on liquidity are positive and significant, which implies 
that a more liquid markets attract scalpers. The argument supporting this conclusion is that 
liquidity attracts market orders demanding immediate execution, which in turn provides order 
flow for scalpers. The coefficient estimates on scalpers’ realized spread are also positive as 
well as significant, implying scalpers are also attracted to the market by their profit per unit 
of volume. The coefficients on the autoregressive term of the conditional intensity log(λ t-1) 
are positive and significant, and the coefficients on the term xt-1 are also positive as well as 
significant. The sum of the coefficient estimates on log(λ t-1) and xt-1 is close to one, which 
emphasis the high persistence of scalpers’ trading. In comparison, the Poisson model fails to 
capture the first order autoregressive nature of the conditional intensity. 
 
The bivariate ACI model is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood of the joint 
probability density in (5) with the marginal densities defined in (6) and conditional intensities 
specified in (7). The transaction of data of May 2000 and July 2000 futures contracts for the 
period of August 1999 through December 1999 are used. The estimation results are reported 
in Table 7. The May 2000 contract is considered as the dominant contract here because its 
volume is higher than that of July 2000 contract during most of our sample period (Figure 1). 
The advantage of the bivariate ACI model is obvious. The sum of the log-likelihood of the 
two univariate ACI models is –11706, while the log-likelihood of the bivariate ACI model is 
–8309, which is a 30% reduction of total value of the univariate log-likelihoods (Table 5). 
   12
Let us first examine the coefficient estimates in the May 2000 contract equation. The 
coefficient estimates of time-of-the-day dummy variables are plotted in Figure 3. The own 
liquidity and spread terms have positive and significant coefficient estimates, while the 
corresponding cross terms have negative and significant coefficient estimates. These results 
imply that scalpers are attracted to the trading of the May 2000 contract due to the liquidity 
and the realized spread they can make in this contract; Scalpers turn away from the trading of 
the May 2000 contract due to the liquidity of the July 2000 contract and the realized spread 
they can make in the trading of the July 2000 contract. Specifically, if the liquidity of the 
May 2000 contract increases by one unit, the average number of scalpers participating in the 
trading of this contract will increase by 6.90 in each five-minute interval. However, if the 
liquidity of the July 2000 contract rises by one unit, the average number of scalpers 
participating in the trading of the May 2000 contract will decrease by 4.92 in each five-
minute interval. The estimation results of the July 2000 contract equation reflect consistent 
relationship. Namely, if the liquidity of the July 2000 contract increases by one unit, the 
average number of scalpers trading this contract will increase by 11.38 in each five-minute 
interval; This figure will decrease by 7.62 if the liquidity of the May 2005 contract increases 
by one unit. The coefficient estimates on log(λ 2t) and yt are both positive and significant, 
implying scalpers’ participation in the trading of these two contracts is positively 
contemporaneously correlated. In summary, these results support Hypothesis 1 that liquidity 
of a market attracts scalpers, and the number of scalpers is also positively related to scalpers’ 
realized spread. 
 
Equation (8) is estimated by OLS using data of May 2000 futures contract, and 
coefficient estimates of the time-of-the-day dummies are plotted in Figure 4. The coefficients 
on both scalpers’ volume and non-scalpers’ volume are positive and significant, implying 
that both scalpers and non-scalpers contribute to the liquidity of the market (Table 8). This 
result supports Hypothesis 2 that scalping increases the liquidity of the market. 
 
The GARCH(1,1) model specified in (9) and (10’) is estimated for the May 2000 
contract, and the results are reported in Table 9. The coefficient estimate on scalpers’ volume 
is negative but insignificant, while the coefficient estimate on non-scalpers’ volume is 
positive and significant. These results imply that the major source of price volatility is non-
scalpers’ trading. While this result does not support hypothesis 3 that scalpers’ trading 





By using the transaction data from the Dalian Futures Exchange, we have studied why 
scalping arise in futures market, and how scalpers’ trading affects liquidity and price 
volatility. A bivariate autoregressive conditional intensity (ACI) model is estimated for two 
most actively traded contracts during our sample period, and the results suggest that scalpers 
are attracted to the market by liquidity as well as scalpers’ realized spread. We have also 
tested while both scalpers and non-scalpers contribute to the liquidity of the market, non-
scalpers’ trading is the source of price volatility.   13
References 
 
Berry, Donald A. and Bernard W. Lindgren. Statistics: Theory and Methods, Second Edition. 
Wadsworth Publishing Company. (1996). 
 
Blume, Marshall and Jeremy Siegel. “The Theory of Security Pricing and Market Structure.” 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments. Vol. 1, No. 3. (1992). 
 
Copeland, Thomas and Dan Galai. “Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread.” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 35, No. 5, 1457-1469. (1983). 
 
Dalian Futures Exchange. “Introduction to Soybean Futures.” May 2000. 
 
Daigler, Robert, and Marilyn Wiley. “The Impact of Trader Type on the Futures Volatility-
Volume Relation.” Journal of Finance. Vol. 54, No. 6, 2297-2316. (1999). 
 
Demsetz, Harold. “The Cost of Transacting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 82, No. 
1, 33-53. (1968). 
 
Engle, Robert, and Jeffrey Russell. “Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model for 
Irregularly Spaced Time Series Data.” University of California, San Diego, unpublished  
manuscript. (1995). 
 
Engle, Robert, and Jeffrey Russell. “Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model for 
Irregularly Spaced Time Series Data.” Econometrica. 1127-1162. (1998). 
 
Engle, Robert, and Joe Lange. “Measuring, Forecasting, and Explaining Time Varying 
Liquidity in the Stock Market.” University of California, San Diego, unpublished  
manuscript. (1997). 
 
Garbade, Kenneth and William Silber. “Structural Organization of Securities Markets: 
Clearing Frequency, Dealer Activity and Liquidity Risk.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 34, 
577-93. (June 1979). 
 
Grossman, Sanford J. and Merton H. Miller. “Liquidity and Market Structure.” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 43, No. 3, 617-633. (1988). 
 
Hawkes, Alan G. “Spectra of Some Self-Exciting and Mutually Exciting Point Processes.” 
Biometrika, Vol. 58, No. 1, 83-90. (1971). 
 
Jorda, Oscar. “Random Time Aggregation in Partial Adjustment Models.” Journal of 
Business Economics and Statistics, Vol 17, No. 3, 382-395. 
 
Jorda, Oscar and Massimiliano Marcellino. “Stochastic Process Subject to Time-Scale 
Transformation: An Applicaton to High-Frequency, FX Data.” Unpublished working 
paper. (2000). 
   14
Kyle, Albert. “Market Structure, Information, Futures Markets, and Price Formation”, in 
International Agricultural Trade: Advanced Readings in Price formation, Market 
Structure, and Price Instability. ed. by Gary G. Storey, Andrew Schmitx, and Alexander 
H. Sarris. Westview Press, Boulder and London. (1984). 
 
Locke, Peter, and Gregory J. Kuserk. “Scalper Behavior in Futures Markets: An Empirical 
Examination.” The Journal of Futures Markets. Vol. 13, No. 4, 409-431 (1993). 
 
O’Hara, Maureen. “Market Microstructure Theory.” Blackwell Publishers. (1995). 
 
Silber, William L. “Marketmaker Behavior in an Auction Market: An Analysis of Scalpers in 
Futures Markets.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 4, 937-953. (1984). 
 
Stoll, Hans. “Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests.” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 1, 115-134. (1989). 
 
Wahal, Sunil. “Entry, Exit, Market Makers, and the Bid-Ask Spread.” Review of Financial 
Studies, 10, 871-901 (1997). (not cited yet) 
Weston, James P. “Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact of Recent Market Reforms.” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 6, 2565-2598 (2000). 
Working, Holbrook. “Whose Markets? Evidence on Some Aspects of Futures Trading.” 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1-11. (1954). 
-------. “Tests of a Theory Concerning Floor Trading on Commodity Exchanges.” Food 
Research Institute Studies, Vol. VII. Supplement: Proceedings of a Symposium on Price 
Effects of Speculation in Organized Commodity Markets. 197-239. (1967). 
-------. “Price Effects of Scalping and Day Trading.” Selected Writings of Holbrook Working, 
Chicago Board of Trade. 181-193. (1977).   15




of    
Number 
of    
Number 
of 
   Brokers     Traders     Scalpers 
       
Jun-99  156   2545    8 
Jul-99  158   2420    7 
Aug-99  164   3053    8 
Sep-99  161   4119    8 
Oct-99  161   4122    8 
Nov-99  169   5390    9 
Dec-99  173   4371    5 
Apr-00  145   5137    7 
                 
 
 
Table 2. Demographics of Member Firms in the Dalian Futures Exchange (April 2000). 
 
                            
Member firms doing brokerage              
                 
  one trading seat          83   
  two trading seats               
      two seats on the trading floor      26     
      one seat on the trading floor, one distance trading seat  12  38   
  three trading seats          8   
  four trading seats          1  130
                 
Members trading for their own account           15
                 
Total                 145
                            
 
 
Table 3. Member Firms, Customers, and Scalpers in the Dalian Futures Exchange (April 
2000). 
 
                     Apparent 
Member Firms           Customers  Scalpers 
             
Brokerage Firms      130 5122    6 
            
Members trading for their own account  15 15    1 
            
Total           145 5137     7   16
Table 4. Trading Volume on the Dalian Futures Exchange. 
 
   All Contracts     Jan. 2000 Contract     March 2000 Contract 
  Total  Scalpers'     Total Scalpers'     Total Scalpers'   
   Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%) 
                   
Jun-99  990046 102859  10.39%    162060 21173 13.06%    106591 9774  9.17% 
Jul-99 733573  39918  5.44%   33961  3113  9.17%    27569  1762  6.39% 
Aug-99  1122148 82822  7.38%   22620  3112 13.76%    16434  1942 11.82% 
Sep-99 1231253  71995  5.85%    5600  732  13.07%    8702  988  11.35% 
Oct-99 929039  70424  7.58%   2987  180  6.03%    3393  314  9.25% 
Nov-99 2086658  235387  11.28%   2920  200  6.85%    6496  372  5.73% 
Dec-99  735863 91746  12.47%   1152  125 10.85%    1579  324 20.52% 
Apr-00                                  
 
 
Table 4. Continued. 
 
   May 2000 Contract     July 1999 Contract     July 2000 Contract 
 Total  Scalpers'      Total  Scalpers'      Total  Scalpers'   
   Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%) 
                    
Jun-99 594468  61866  10.41%   5147  218  4.24%        
Jul-99  646750 33742 5.22%   4769  10  0.21%   581  316 54.39% 
Aug-99  1034810  74164 7.17%            25519 2123 8.32% 
Sep-99  1088857  62004 5.69%            117641 7629 6.48% 
Oct-99 462941  28711  6.20%           373450  32349  8.66% 
Nov-99 434305  33518  7.72%           853646 100590 11.78% 
Dec-99 19849  744  3.75%          76114  12089 15.88% 
Apr-00  8918  300  3.36%                 5736  471  8.21% 
 
 
Table 4. Continued. 
 
   Sept. 1999 Contract     Sept. 2000 Contract     Nov. 1999 Contract 
 Total  Scalpers'      Total  Scalpers'      Total  Scalpers'   
   Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%) 
                     
Jun-99 84876  6772  7.98%          36904  3056  8.28% 
Jul-99 13118  554  4.22%           6825  421  6.17% 
Aug-99 14516  762  5.25%           8249  719  8.72% 
Sep-99 1695  34  2.01%   4741  384  8.10%   4017  224  5.58% 
Oct-99       84331  8820  10.46%    1937  50  2.58% 
Nov-99       772588  99297  12.85%    841  0 0.00% 
Dec-99        573784  68403  11.92%        
Apr-00              394617  24960  6.33%             
   17
Table 4. Continued. 
 
   Nov. 2000 Contract     Jan. 2001 Contract     March 2001 Contract 
  Total Scalpers'     Total Scalpers'     Total Scalpers'   
   Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%)     Volume  Volume  (%) 
                  
Jun-99                   
Jul-99                   
Aug-99                   
Sep-99                   
Oct-99                   
Nov-99  15862 1410 8.89%              
Dec-99  63385  10061  15.87%              
Apr-00  312370  25003  8.00%     410309  26130 6.37%     19638  1843 9.38%   18
Table 5. Comparison of Poisson, Univariate ACI, and Bivariate ACI Models. 
 
         # of       
    Log-  Dummy  # of   % of Reduction 
Model     Likelihood  Variables  Parameters   in Loglikelihood 
     `    
Poisson        
  May 2000 Contract  -12727.90  30  33   
  July 2000 Contract  -8931.09  27  30   
          
Univariate ACI         
  May 2000 Contract  -6636.28  30  34  48% (Compared to Poisson) 
  July 2000 Contract  -5070.16  27  31  43% (Compared to Poisson) 
   Total  -11706.44  57  65   
          
Bivariate ACI  -8309.29  39  57  30% 




Table 6. Estimation Results of the Univariate ACI Model. 
 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
        
May 2000 Soybean Futures       
        
log(λ t-1)  0.9688 0.0011  844.2395  0.0000 
xt-1 0.0277  0.0010  27.4005  0.0000 
liqt-1 2.3000  0.2000  11.4844  0.0000 
spreadt-1 0.0063  0.0015  4.1735  0.0000 
        
Log likelihood  -6636.28      Akaike info criterion  1.2958 
Avg. log likelihood  -0.64      Schwarz criterion  1.3197 
Number of Coefs.  34      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.3039 
        
        
July 2000 Soybean Futures       
        
log(λ t-1)  0.9924 0.0005  2151.1380  0.0000 
xt-1 0.0068  0.0007  10.3650  0.0000 
liqt-1 1.2320  0.1998  6.1686  0.0000 
spreadt-1 0.0034  0.0017  2.0058  0.0449 
        
        
Log likelihood  -5070.16      Akaike info criterion  1.4032 
Avg. log likelihood  -0.70      Schwarz criterion  1.4325 
Number of Coefs.  31      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.4133 
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Table 7. Estimation Results of the Bivariate ACI model. 
 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
        
Equation 1 (July 2000 Soybean Futures)     
        
log(λ 1,t-1)  0.7892 0.0211  37.3323  0.0000 
xt-1 0.0786  0.0083  9.4990  0.0000 
liq1,t-1 11.3800  2.1600  5.2867  0.0000 
spread1,t-1 0.0176  0.0079  2.2160  0.0267 
log(λ 2t)  0.8187 0.1284  6.3764  0.0000 
yt 0.1146  0.0081  14.1410  0.0000 
log(λ 2,t-1)  -0.6385 0.1145  -5.5784  0.0000 
yt-1 -0.1914  0.0116  -16.5428  0.0000 
liq2,t-1 -7.6200  1.2620  -6.0449  0.0000 
spread2,t-1 -0.0190  0.0073  -2.5949  0.0095 
        
Equation 2 (May 2000 Soybean Futures)     
        
log(λ 1,t-1)  0.1145 0.0085  13.4693  0.0000 
xt-1 -0.0345  0.0040  -8.6506  0.0000 
liq1,t-1 -4.9200  1.2780  -3.8587  0.0001 
spread1,t-1 -0.0109  0.0050  -2.1966  0.0281 
log(λ 2,t-1)  0.8814 0.0078  113.6572  0.0000 
yt-1 0.0528  0.0038  13.7748  0.0000 
liq2,t-1 6.9000  0.7240  9.5224  0.0000 
spread2,t-1 0.0164  0.0045  3.6100  0.0003 
        
              
        
Log likelihood  -8309.2880      Akaike info criterion  2.3013 
Avg. log likelihood  -1.1428      Schwarz criterion  2.3553 
Number of Coefs.  57.0000      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.3199 
              
 
 
Table 8. Estimation Results in Equation (8). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
              
ν t  10.9516 1.1758 9.3145  0.0000 
ρ t  91.5747 3.1303  29.2544  0.0000 
              
R-squared  0.3952      Mean dependent var  0.0116 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3886      S.D. dependent var  0.0086 
S.E. of regression  0.0067      Akaike info criterion  -7.1583 
Sum squared resid  0.1165      Schwarz criterion  -7.0932 
Log likelihood  9381.3800      Durbin-Watson stat  1.4325 
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Table 9. Estimation Results of GARCH(1,1). 
 
   Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
              
Constant 1.2373  19.6203  0.0631  0.9497 
 pt-1 0.7123  0.0070  101.7949  0.0000 
              
          Variance Equation          
        
Constant 169521.8000  4199.1520  40.3705  0.0000 
2
1 − t ε   0.7517 0.0078  95.7673  0.0000 
2
1 − t σ   -0.0829 0.0014  -58.1871  0.0000 
svolt -5.2839  195.7793  -0.0270  0.9785 
nsvolt 31.6275  8.4970  3.7222  0.0002 
 pt
2 0.1008  0.0037  27.3862  0.0000 
        
R-squared  0.6649      Mean dependent var  743.7728 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6647      S.D. dependent var  986.2558 
S.E. of regression  571.1125      Akaike info criterion  15.0360 
Sum squared resid  3360000000      Schwarz criterion  15.0416 
Log likelihood  -77389.9000      F-statistic  2915.9570 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.4274      Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 
        
 
   21
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Figure 2. Intraday Seasonal Pattern of Liquidity, Volatility and Number of Scalpers in the Dalian 
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Figure 3. Estimates of Dummy Variables in the Bivariate ACI model. 
 



































































































































































































Figure 4. Estimates of the Time-of-the-Day Dummy Variables in Equation (8). 
 
Intraday Seasonality of Liquidity 
(May 2000 Soybean Futures Contract)
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
9:00
9:05
9:10
9:15
9:20
9:25
9:30
9:35
9:40
9:45
9:50
9:55
10:00
10:05
10:10
10:15
10:20
10:25
10:30
10:35
10:40
10:45
10:50
10:55
11:00
11:05
11:10
11:15
11:20
11:25
(
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
 
t
o
n
/
y
u
a
n
)
morning break
 